## 1NC

### Off

**Their affirmative’s hegemonic strategy is not benign – it creates a self-fulfilling prophecy where the threats that the seek to prevent occur because of the US attempt to maintain a political order**

SAMIR **AMIN** director of the African office (in Dakar, Senegal) of the Third World Forum, an international nongovernmental association for research and debate, and chair of the World Forum for Alternatives. He is the author of numerous books and articles including Beyond U.S. Hegemony 25 FEB **2003** (“The Alternative to the neoliberal system of globalization and militarism Imperialism Today and the Hegemonic Offensive of the United States.”)

28. The hegemonic strategy of the United States is articulated on the collective character of new imperialism and to the profit of the insufficiencies and weaknesses of the “antineoliberal” social and political movements. 29. This strategy, barely recognized by the “proAmerican” defenders, is, in the dominant discourse, the object of two “soft” propositions, not quite real, but operational, from the point of view of our opponent. The first is that this hegemony belongs to a “gentle” leadership, sometimes knows as “benign hegemony” by the democratic fraction of the American establishment. Through this mix of false naivety and real hypocrisy, this discourse pretends that the United States only acts in the interests of the peoples who are associated with the triad, motivated by the same “democratic” pulses, and even the interests of the rest of the world, to whom globalization offers the chance of “development”, reinforced by the benefits of democracy that American powers promote everywhere, as we know. The second is that, in all domains, the Unites States benefit from enormous advantages  whether it be economic, scientific, political, military or cultural that legitimize their hegemony. In fact, American hegemony works from logic, and a system, that has little to do with the discourse it envelops. 30. The objectives of this hegemony have been proclaimed, and adhered to in innumerable productions from the US leaders (unfortunately, little read by its victims). After the fall of the USSR  their only potential military adversary  the US establishment evaluates that it has a period of about 20 years to put into place its global hegemony and reduce to nothingness the possibilities of its potential “rivals”, not that they are necessarily capable of an alternative hegemony, just capable of affirming their autonomy in a global system that would be “nonhegemonic”  in my language, a multicentric system. These “rivals” are of course Europe (we no longer hear talks about a Japan hegemony !), but also Russia and most of all China, the principal designated adversary that Washington may have to envision destroying (militarily) if she continues to persist in her “development” and a certain independent will. Other rivals have also been noted, in fact, all Southern countries that may develop a resistance to the exigencies of globalized neoliberalism  India or Brazil, Iran or South Africa. 31. The objectives are therefore to vassalize the allies in the triad, to make them incapable of effective global initiatives, and to destroy the “large countries”, always by nature too “big” (the United States being the only one with right to be so). Dismantle Russia after the USSR, dismantle China, India, even Brazil; instrumentalising the weaknesses of each country’s power systems, manipulate the former States of the USSR, and stroke the centrifugal forces in the Russian Federation, support the Muslims of Xinjiang and the Tibetan monks, feeding the conflict with the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, intervening in the Amazon (Plan Colombia), etc.

**construction of threats by the affirmative is an example of biased research informed by the military which ensures we misunderstand how tensions arise in the international arena, creating war**

**Burke, 7** (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action**.** The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror' Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

THE ALTERNATIVE IS TO VOTE NEGATIVE BECAUSE THE 1AC IS NOT TRUE – THE 1AC CONSTRUCTS THREATS AND MISREPRESENTS REALITY – PRESUME NEGATIVE

Krause and Williams 97 (Keith Krause, professor of political science at the Graduate Institute on International and Development Studies, Michael C Williams, professor of international relations at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, “From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies,” chapter 2 of Critical Security Studies, p 49-50)

The challenges to the conventional understanding of security and the object to be secured also necessitate an epistemological shift in the way security is to be understood and studied. What is involved is a shift in focus from abstract individualism and contractual sovereignty to a stress on culture, civilization, and identity; the role of ideas, norms, and values in the constitution of that which is to be secured; and the historical context within which this process takes place. Epistemologically, this involves moving away from the objectivist, rationalist approach of both neorealism and neoliberalism, and toward more interpretive modes of analysis. While these issues have gained some prominence in debates over the nature of regime theory and the study of international organizations, they have made little impact on security studies.51 This is clearly illustrated by Helga Haftendorn’s attempts to broaden the ambit of security studies. On method, she concludes that the goal of security studies is “to construct an empirically testable paradigm,” which involves defining the “set of observational hypotheses,” the “hard core of irrefutable assumptions,” and the “‘set of scope conditions’ that…are required for a ‘progressive’ research program.” Although she admits that “we might do well to follow [Robert] Keohane’s counsel to apply somewhat ‘softer,’ more interpretive standards,” there is little room in this approach for studying norm change and the role of ideational elements in *constituting* the historical context within which actors take specific decisions.52 Despite Haftendorn’s goal of incorporating new issues that are normatively driven, the subordination of normative and reflexive conceptions of agency to objectivist visions of method remains largely undisturbed, and she remains committed to the fact value distinction. To understand security from a broader perspective means to look at the ways in which the objects to be secured, the perceptions of threats to them, and the available means of securing them (both intellectual and material) have shifted over time.53 New threats emerge; new enemies are created; erstwhile fellow citizens become objects of hatred and violence; former enemies can be transformed into members of the same community. The status of Others is uncertain, needing to be deciphered and determined.54 To comprehend these processes requires an understanding of the problematics of security as constituted by self-reflexive historical practices. The knightly code of honor, for example, was both a central structuring practice of latemedieval conflict and a central object that was to be secured. Honor was an integral part of conflict in its genesis as well as its practice. To view the military conflict of the late-medieval world as a competition between instrumentally rational actors in the modern sense is to misunderstand it in both form and content.55 The shift to interpretive models of understanding (broadly conceived) also yields a different vision of the transformation of practices. As historically grounded, the practices of security become capable of conscious transformation through the process of critical reflection. No longer objective in the sense of a fixed reality that the analyst can only mirror, reality as the realm of subjective practices and structures becomes self-reflexive. This is most emphatically not to say that security studies needs to move away from studying the role of ideas, institutions, and instruments of organized violence in political life. In this respect, the continuing defenders of traditional strategic/security studies are correct (although this formulation will probably leave them uncomfortable). But if we are to understand these realities, we must take them more seriously than the abstractions of neorealism allow. We must grasp the genesis and structure of particular security problems as grounded in concrete historical conditions and practices, rather than in abstract assertions of transcendental rational actors and scientific methods. We must understand the genesis of conflicts and the creation of the dilemmas of security as grounded in reflexive practices rather than as the outcome of timeless structures.56

### Case

#### **There is no uniqueness to this advantage – there is no evidence that indicates multilateralism is declining now – here’s evidence that says the opposite**

Walt 11 (Stephen, Professor of International Relations – Harvard University, “Does the U.S. still need to reassure its allies?” Foreign Policy, 12-5, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/05/us\_credibility\_is\_not\_our\_problem, GDI File)

--threats to our cred are always exaggerated

--nobody can overtake us

A perennial preoccupation of U.S. diplomacy has been the perceived need to reassure allies of our reliability. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. leaders worried that any loss of credibility might cause dominoes to fall, lead key allies to "bandwagon" with the Soviet Union, or result in some form of "Finlandization." Such concerns justified fighting so-called "credibility wars" (including Vietnam), where the main concern was not the direct stakes of the contest but rather the need to retain a reputation for resolve and capability. Similar fears also led the United States to deploy thousands of nuclear weapons in Europe, as a supposed counter to Soviet missiles targeted against our NATO allies. The possibility that key allies would abandon us was almost always exaggerated, but U.S. leaders remain overly sensitive to the possibility. So Vice President Joe Biden has been out on the road this past week, telling various U.S. allies that "the United States isn't going anywhere." (He wasn't suggesting we're stuck in a rut, of course, but saying that the imminent withdrawal from Iraq doesn't mean a retreat to isolationism or anything like that.) There's nothing really wrong with offering up this sort of comforting rhetoric, but I've never really understood whyleaders were so worried about the credibility of our commitments to others. For starters, given our remarkably secure geopolitical position, whether U.S. pledges are credible is first and foremost a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help. We should therefore take our allies' occasional hints about realignment or neutrality with some skepticism; they have every incentive to try to make us worry about it, but in most cases little incentive to actually do it.

#### Multilateralism empirically doesn’t solve anything – leaders refuse to comply, states won’t cooperate, and it creates a cost for allies

- state leaders refuse to comply with multilat requirements & aren’t afraid of the consequences

- actors fall outside constraints imposed by global norms & as they refuse to comply the US and other major powers will revert back to unilateral security threats as well

- states all have different motivations concerning security so they won’t act cooperatively or with any urgency in a multilat FW

- multilat incurs some costs to allies – Iraq proves this deters broader coop

- predictive of future multilat probs

Harvey, 4 – University Research Professor of International Relations, professor in the Department of Political Science, and the director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University (Frank, Smoke And Mirrors: Globalized Terrorism And The Illusion Of Multilateral Security, p. 43-45) // bghs-ms

The typical argument favouring multilateralism is a simple one, sum- marized by Ramesh Thakur: ‘Because the world is essentially anarchi- cal, it is fundamentally insecure, characterized by strategic uncertainty and complexity because of too many actors with multiple goals and interests and variable capabilities and convictions. Collective action embedded in international institutions that mirror mainly U.S. value preferences and interests enhances predictability, reduces uncertainty, and cuts the transaction costs of intemational action.’" With respect to peacekeeping, for example, Thakur argues that if ‘the UN helps to mute the costs and spread the risks of the terms of intemational engagement to maximise these benefits, the United States will need to instill in others, as well as itself embrace, the principle of multilateralism as a norm in its own right: states must do X because the United Nations has called for X, and good states do what the United Nations asks them to do.’l2 But there are several problems with Thakur's defence of collective action and associated policy recommendations, particularly in relation to multilateral approaches to security in a post-9/11 setting. First, and foremost, state leaders often refuse to do what the UN asks of them, are often more than prepared to have their publics suffer the consequences of whatever sanctions the UN can mount, and are rarely directly affected by the sanctions that are implemented – assuming the permanent members of the Security Council find it in their collective interest to implement a sanctions regime in the first place. The lessons from UN intervention and sanction efforts over the past decade are not at all encouraging in this regard. Second, many state and non-state actors fall outside the institutional constraints imposed on the system through global norms and regimes. As the capacity spreads for smaller and smaller groups to inflict increasingly devastating levels of damage on larger states, international institutions will lose the capacity to force or coerce compliance with international law. Consequently, leaders of major powers, such as the United States, will be compelled to respond to security threats through unilateral initiatives. This compulsion will force other powers to push that much harder to control American impulses by demanding that multilateral consensus remain the sole guarantor of legitimacy. These tensions will be exacerbated by the prevailing perception in the United States that these same multilateral institutions are constraining the power and capacity of the U.S. government to protect American citizens from emerging threats of terrorism and proliferation. Third, the collective-action argument put forward by Thai-cur typically (and erroneously) assumes that most states are governed by a similar set of political priorities, share common concerns about similar combinations of security threats, are stimulated into action (or inaction) by the same set of economic imperatives, are inspired by a common set of interests and overarching values (such as peace, security, stability), and are encouraged by their respective publics to meet their demands for a common set of public goods. But the differences, tensions, and overall level of competition among states in the system are far greater than proponents of multilateralism acknowledge. Some states are more threatened by terrorism and proliferation than others, have more substantial and direct economic interest in particular regions, are less interested in securing peace, and experience pressure from their respective publics to pursue very distinct foreign and security policies. Consequently, there is no guarantee that a collection of states will have the same motivation to change the status quo, or experience the same imperative to address the same security threats with the same level of resolve, commitment, or resources (relative to their size). In sum, multi- lateral organizations are less likely today to act with the same level of urgency to address security threats that Washington considers imperative. The costs of inaction (derived from exclusive reliance on multilateral consensus) are now perceived as being higher than the costs of unilateralism. Although similar threats may have guided collective action through multilateral alliances for much of the cold war, these imperatives were a product of a common Soviet threat. But threats today are many and varied, and few states share the same concerns or face the same obligations to respond. No case more clearly illustrates the growing divisions among former allies than the 2003 Iraq war. Fourth, decreasing transaction costs may be a valid argument in favour of multilateral cooperation in some cases (e. g., to facilitate post- conflict reconstruction, political reforms, democratization, elections run by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, food aid, water distribution, and the provision of medical supplies and facilities), but this is not true for all security challenges. In a post-9/11 environment, the transaction costs that are saved through joint efforts will always be compared with the costs of depending exclusively on collective-action mechanisms that ultimately may fail - multilateralism is not free of costs or risks. For example, one of the many important lessons of the 2003 Iraq war, at least for American officials, is that there are no collective-security guarantees any longer, even from traditional allies. The UN Security Council did not function as a separate entity committed to facilitating and coordinating diplomatic exchanges towards a common good. The UN functions in a highly competitive environment in which traditional power politics plays out. Proponents of multilateralism through the UNSC do not espouse that doctrine in the interest of global security; their efforts are typically designed to use the institution to limit the capacity of the U.S. to act unilaterally to protect American interests. That level of competition, itself driven by competing interpretations of interests, values, and threats, does not lend itself well to the kind of multilateralism its proponents aspire to achieve. Of course, if France shared the same concerns about terrorism, or if leaders in Paris were equally motivated to address the potential for WMD proliferation in and through Iraq, the transaction costs incurred by responding through the UN would be more acceptable. But as threat perceptions continue to diverge, the risks associated with waiting for multilateral consensus are simply too high. The complex nature of contemporary security threats virtually guarantees that similar conflicts will plague multilateral institutions in the future.

#### **The plan fails and public backlash means it cannot solve in the long-term**

Lake 10 (Professor of Social Sciences, distinguished professor of political science at UC San Diego, David A., “Making America Safe for the World: Multilateralism and the Rehabilitation of US authority”, http://dss.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeMakingAmericaSafe.pdf)//NG

At the same time, if any organization is to be an effective restraint on the United States, other countries will have to make serious and integral contributions to the collective effort. Both sides to this new multilateral bargain will need to recognize and appreciate the benefits of a stable international order to their own security and prosperity and contribute to its success - 480 Making America Safe for the World. The United States will need to continue to play a disproportionate role in providing international order, even as it accepts new restraints on its freedom of action. Other countries, however, must also contribute to the provision of this political order so that they can provide a meaningful check on US authority. ¶ Americans are likely to resist the idea of tying their hands more tightly in a new multilateral compact.

#### Guantanamo Bay, failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and joining the ICC are other roadblocks to multilateralism that the affirmative doesn’t resolve

Burgsdorff 9(Ph. D in Political Science from Freiburg University, EU Fellow at the University of Miami (Sven Kühn von, “Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration”, http://aei.pitt.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/11047/1/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf)//NG

As a matter of fact, together with other measures such as closing Guantanamo, signing up to the Kyoto Protocol and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the Bali conference, and possibly, joining the International Criminal Court as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism.

#### There is no impact to hegemony – statistics indicate there is no causal relation between US power and global peace

**Fettweis, 11**

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### The affirmative assumption that the international order would fall apart without a strong US lead is wrong – countries would not start fighting for no reason

**Fettweis, 11**

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

Assertions that without the combination of U.S. capabilities, presence and commitments instability would return to Europe and the Pacific Rim are usually rendered in rather vague language. If the United States were to decrease its commitments abroad, argued Robert Art, “the world will become a more dangerous place and, sooner or later, that will redound to America’s detriment.”53 From where would this danger arise? Who precisely would do the fighting, and over what issues? Without the United States, would Europe really descend into Hobbesian anarchy? Would the Japanese attack mainland China again, to see if they could fare better this time around? Would the Germans and French have another go at it? In other words, where exactly is hegemony is keeping the peace? With one exception, these questions are rarely addressed. That exception is in the Pacific Rim. Some analysts fear that a de facto surrender of U.S. hegemony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become “the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture,” and that Beijing would come to “dominate science and technology, in all its forms” to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but “plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future.”54 Indeed China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it still is only about 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed, decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to somewhere between one-tenth and one-fifth of the U.S. level. It is hardly clear that a restrained United States would invite Chinese regional, must less global, political expansion. Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where war is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less severe than ever before. Believers in the pacifying power of hegemony ought to keep in mind a rather basic tenet: When it comes to policymaking, specific threats are more significant than vague, unnamed dangers. Without specific risks, it is just as plausible to interpret U.S. presence as redundant, as overseeing a peace that has already arrived. Strategy should not be based upon vague images emerging from the dark reaches of the neoconservative imagination. Overestimating Our Importance One of the most basic insights of cognitive psychology provides the final reason to doubt the power of hegemonic stability: Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we perceive them to be. A great deal of experimental evidence exists to support the notion that people (and therefore states) tend to overrate the degree to which their behavior is responsible for the actions of others. Robert Jervis has argued that two processes account for this overestimation, both of which would seem to be especially relevant in the U.S. case.55 First, believing that we are responsible for their actions gratifies our national ego (which is not small to begin with; the United States is exceptional in its exceptionalism). The hubris of the United States, long appreciated and noted, has only grown with the collapse of the Soviet Union.56 U.S. policymakers famously have comparatively little knowledge of—or interest in—events that occur outside of their own borders. If there is any state vulnerable to the overestimation of its importance due to the fundamental misunderstanding of the motivation of others, it would have to be the United States. Second, policymakers in the United States are far more familiar with our actions than they are with the decision-making processes of our allies. Try as we might, it is not possible to fully understand the threats, challenges, and opportunities that our allies see from their perspective. The European great powers have domestic politics as complex as ours, and they also have competent, capable strategists to chart their way forward. They react to many international forces, of which U.S. behavior is only one. Therefore, for any actor trying to make sense of the action of others, Jervis notes, “in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the most obvious and parsimonious explanation is that he was responsible.”57 It is natural, therefore, for U.S. policymakers and strategists to believe that the behavior of our allies (and rivals) is shaped largely by what Washington does. Presumably Americans are at least as susceptible to the overestimation of their ability as any other people, and perhaps more so. At the very least, political psychologists tell us, we are probably not as important to them as we think. The importance of U.S. hegemony in contributing to international stability is therefore almost certainly overrated. In the end, one can never be sure why our major allies have not gone to, and do not even plan for, war. Like deterrence, the hegemonic stability theory rests on faith; it can only be falsified, never proven. It does not seem likely, however, that hegemony could fully account for twenty years of strategic decisions made in allied capitals if the international system were not already a remarkably peaceful place. Perhaps these states have no intention of fighting one another to begin with, and our commitments are redundant. European great powers may well have chosen strategic restraint because they feel that their security is all but assured, with or without the United States.

**There is no impact to US credibility**

**MacDonald and Parent** 20**11** - \*Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, \*\*Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami (Paul and Joseph, International Security, 35.4, "Graceful decline? The surprising success of great power retrenchment", http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ISEC\_a\_00034-MacDonald\_proof2.pdf, WEA)

These arguments have a number of limitations. First, opponents of retrenchment exaggerate the importance of credibility in the defense of commitments. Just because a state has signaled a willingness to retreat from one commitment does not mean it will retreat from others. Studies of reputation, for example, have demonstrated a tenuous link between past behavior and current reputation.22 The capacity to defend a commitment is as important as credibility in determining the strength of a commitment. Quantitative studies have likewise found a mixed link between previous concessions and deterrence failure.23 The balance of power between the challenger and the defender, in contrast, is often decisive. For instance, after a series of crises over Berlin and Cuba, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan observed to his cabinet, “The fact that the Soviet Government had agreed to withdraw their missiles and their aircraft from Cuba was not evidence of weakness but of realism. . . . But Berlin was an entirely different question; not only was it of vital importance to the Soviet Government but the Russians had overwhelming conventional superiority in the area.”24 This finding supports the basic insight of retrenchment: by con- centrating scarce resources, a policy of retrenchment exchanges a diffuse repu- tation for toughness for a concentrated capability at key points of challenge. Second, pessimists overstate the extent to which a policy of retrenchment can damage a great power’s capabilities or prestige. Gilpin, in particular, assumes that a great power’s commitments are on equal footing and interde- pendent. In practice, however, great powers make commitments of varying de- grees that are functionally independent of one another. Concession in one area need not be seen as influencing a commitment in another area.25 Far from being perceived as interdependent, great power commitments are often seen as being rivalries, so that abandoning commitments in one area may actually bolster the strength of a commitment in another area. During the Korean War, for instance, President Harry Truman’s administration explicitly backed away from total victory on the peninsula to strengthen deterrence in Europe.26 Re- treat in an area of lesser importance freed up resources and signaled a strong commitment to an area of greater significance. Third, critics do not just oversell the hazards of retrenchment; they down- play the dangers of preventive war.27 Both Gilpin and Copeland praise the ability of preventive war to arrest great power decline by defusing the threat posed to a hegemonic power by an isolated challenger. Such reasoning disre- gards the warning of Otto von Bismarck and others that preventive war is “suicide from fear of death.”28 In practice, great powers operate in a much more constrained and complex security environment in which they face multi- ple threats on several fronts. Powers pursuing preventive war are shouldering grave risks: preventive war may require resources that are unavailable or allies that are difficult to recruit, and defeat in preventive war opens floodgates to exploitation on multiple fronts. Even a successful war, if sufficiently costly, can weaken a great power to the point of vulnerability.29 For most great powers, the potential loss of security in the future as a result of relative decline rarely justifies inviting the hazards of war in the present.

No Korean war---laundry list---(rational regime, empirics, military inferiority, and it’s all just domestic propaganda)

Fisher ‘13 Max, Foreign Policy Writer @ Washington Post & Former Editor at the Atlantic, “Why North Korea loves to threaten World War III (but probably won’t follow through)” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/03/12/why-north-korea-loves-to-threaten-world-war-iii-but-probably-wont-follow-through/

North Korea is indeed a dangerous rogue state that has, in the recent past, staged small-scale but deadly attacks on South Korea without provocation. In March 2010, a South Korean navy ship was attacked by a ship of unknown origin, killing 46 on board; though North Korea denied responsibility, an investigation concluded it was likely responsible. A few months later, North Korea fired over 100 artillery shells at Yeonpyeong Island, killing two civilians and wounding 19.

But is North Korea really an irrational nation on the brink of launching “all-out war,” a mad dog of East Asia? Is Pyongyang ready to sacrifice it all? Probably not. The North Korean regime, for all its cruelty, has also shown itself to be **shrewd, calculating, and single-mindedly obsessed with its own self-preservation**. The regime’s past behavior **suggests pretty strongly** that these **threats are empty**. But they still matter.

**For years**, North Korea has threatened the worst and, despite all of its apparent readiness, never gone through with it. So why does it keep going through these macabre performances? We can’t read Kim Jong Eun’s mind, but the most plausible explanation has to do with internal North Korean politics, with trying to set the tone for regional politics, and with forcing other countries (including the United States) to bear the costs of preventing its outbursts from sparking an unwanted war.

Starting World War III or a second Korean War would not serve any of Pyongyang’s interests. Whether or not it deploys its small but legitimately scary nuclear arsenal, North Korea could indeed cause substantial mayhem in the South, whose capital is mere miles from the border. But the North Korean military is antiquated and inferior; it wouldn’t last long against a U.S.-led counterattack. No matter how badly such a war would go for South Korea or the United States, it would almost **certainly end with the regime’s total destruction**.

Still, provocations and threats do serve Pyongyang’s interests, even if no one takes those threats very seriously. It helps to rally North Koreans, particularly the all-important military, behind the leader who has done so much to impoverish them. It also helps Pyongyang to control the regional politics that should otherwise be so hostile to its interests. Howard French, a former New York Times bureau chief for Northeast Asia whom I had the pleasure of editing at The Atlantic, explained on Kim Jong Il’s death that Kim had made up for North Korea’s weakness with canny belligerence:

The shtick of apparent madness flowed from his country’s fundamental weakness as he, like a master poker player, resolved to bluff and bluff big. Kim adopted a game of brinkmanship with the South, threatening repeatedly to turn Seoul into a “sea of flames.” And while this may have sharply raised the threat of war, for the North, it steadily won concessions: fuel oil deliveries, food aid, nuclear reactor construction, hard cash-earning tourist enclaves and investment zones.

At the risk of insulting Kim Jong Eun, it helps to think of North Korea’s provocations as somewhat akin to a child throwing a temper tantrum. He might do lots of shouting, make some over-the-top declarations (“I hate my sister,” “I’m never going back to school again”) and even throw a punch or two. Still, you give the child the attention he craves and maybe even a toy, **not because you think the threats are real** or because he deserves it, but because you want the tantrum to stop.

## 2NC

**APOCALYTPIC PREDICTIONS AS FORWARDED BY THE 1AC SUCH AS [ ] ENSURE THAT POLICY ANALYSIS FAILS**

**Kurasawa 4** – Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight”, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf

Up to this point, I have tried to demonstrate that transnational socio-political relations are nurturing a thriving culture and infrastructure of prevention from below, which challenges presumptions about the inscrutability of the future (II) and a stance of indifference toward it (III). Nonetheless, unless and until it is substantively ‘filled in,’ the argument is vulnerable to misappropriation since farsightedness does not in and of itself ensure emancipatory outcomes. Therefore, this section proposes to specify normative criteria and participatory procedures through which citizens can determine the ‘reasonableness,’ legitimacy, and effectiveness of competing dystopian visions in order to arrive at a socially self-instituting future. Foremost among the possible distortions of farsightedness is alarmism, the manufacturing of unwarranted and unfounded **doomsday scenarios.** State and market institutions may seek to **produce a culture of fear by** deliberately **stretching interpretations of reality** beyond the limits of the plausible so as to exaggerate the prospects of impending catastrophes, or yet again, by intentionally promoting certain prognoses over others for instrumental purposes. Accordingly, regressive **dystopias** can **operate as Trojan horses advancing political agendas** or commercial interests **that would otherwise be susceptible to public scrutiny** and opposition. Instances of this kind of manipulation of the dystopian imaginary are plentiful: the invasion of Iraq in the name of fighting terrorism and an imminent threat of use of ‘weapons of mass destruction’; the severe curtailing of American civil liberties amidst fears of a collapse of ‘homeland security’; the neoliberal dismantling of the welfare state as the only remedy for an ideologically constructed fiscal crisis; the conservative expansion of policing and incarceration due to supposedly spiraling crime waves; and so forth. Alarmism constructs and codes the future in particular ways, producing or reinforcing certain crisis narratives, belief structures, and rhetorical conventions. As much as alarmist ideas beget a culture of fear, the reverse is no less true. If fear-mongering is a misappropriation of preventive foresight, resignation about the future represents a problematic outgrowth of the popular acknowledgment of global perils. Some believe that the world to come is so uncertain and dangerous that we should not attempt to modify the course of history; the future will look after itself for better or worse, regardless of what we do or wish. One version of this argument consists in a complacent optimism perceiving the future as fated to be better than either the past or the present. Frequently accompanying it is a self-deluding denial of what is plausible (‘the world will not be so bad after all’), or a naively Panglossian pragmatism (‘things will work themselves out in spite of everything, because humankind always finds ways to survive’).37 Much more common, however, is the opposite reaction, a fatalistic pessimism reconciled to the idea that the future will be necessarily worse than what preceded it. **This is sustained by a tragic chronological framework according to which humanity is doomed to decay**, or a cyclical one of the endless repetition of the mistakes of the past. On top of their dubious assessments of what is to come, **alarmism** and resignation would, if widely accepted, **undermine a viable practice of farsightedness**. Indeed, both of them encourage public disengagement from deliberation about scenarios for the future, a process that appears to be dangerous, pointless, or unnecessary. **The resulting ‘depublicization’ of debate leaves dominant groups and institutions**(the state, the market, techno-science) **in charge of sorting out the future for the rest of us,** thus effectively **producing a heteronomous social order**. How, then, can we support a democratic process of prevention from below? The answer, I think, lies in cultivating the public capacity for critical judgment and deliberation, so that participants in global civil society subject all claims about potential catastrophes to examination, evaluation, and contestation. Two normative concepts are particularly well suited to grounding these tasks: the precautionary principle and global justice.

## 1NR

No cards